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The Development of Legal
Protection for Mediation
Confidentiality in Hong Kong
A.K.C. Koo* and Yun Zhaot
Abstract: One of the underlying objectives of the reformed civil justice
system in Hong Kong is to facilitate the settlement of disputes. The court
is now under the duty of active case management to encourage and
promote the use of an alternative dispute resolution procedure where
appropriate. Facilitative mediation was generally practised in Hong
Kong before the Civil Justice Reform. By issuing a specific practice
direction on mediation, the judiciary has given a strong boost for this
process to the extent that parties may even be penalized in costs if they
unreasonably refuse to mediate. The continuous transfer of conflict
resolution from the hands of the judge to the parties gives rise to an
increasing risk that information disclosed in mediation may be used to
the parties' disadvantage in subsequent legal proceedings. This paper
examines the precise scope of three common law principles that protect
confidentiality of mediation communications. Drawing upon the ap-
proaches of local institutions, the US Uniform Mediation Act and the EU
Mediation Directive, it considers the arguments that might be relevant
in deciding what law should govern the issues at present not covered by
the existing legal framework, a question that has become more pressing
in view of the fact that negotiations have begun on a proposed medi-
ation ordinance to deal with it.
Keywords: confidentiality; Hong Kong; legal professional privilege;
legislation on mediation; mediation; without prejudice communications
I. Introduction
Facilitative mediation is one important alternative dispute resolution
mechanism. It provides a timely and flexible means to resolve various
types of disputes in daily life. Unlike negotiation, a neutral third party
clarifies and enhances communications between the disputants; un-
like arbitration, the mediator in no way acts as referee in the dispute.
The principal role of a facilitative mediator is to structure a co-
* A.K.C. Koo, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong;
e-mail: akckoo@hku.hk
t Yun Zhao, Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Hong Kong.
The paper is fully supported by a research grant from the Research Grants Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. 755109).
Common Law World Review 40 (2011) 263-277
DOI: 10.1350/clwr.2011.40.3.0225
263
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
operative, interest-based process for the purpose of assisting the dis-
puting parties to reach a mutually agreed settlement. Skilled
mediators enable the parties to give vent to their feelings and direct
them to rational discussions, which is believed to be essential to main-
tain an ongoing inter-party relationship. As such, Chinese societies
have strong cultural traditions for mediation, emphasizing the Con-
fucian doctrine of the meaning and concept of harmony. Over the past
two decades, various common law jurisdictions attached greater
importance to mediation in the civil justice system.
In Hong Kong, mediation has become part of the court's process
since the implementation of the Civil Justice Reform in April 2009. An
underlying objective of the reformed civil justice system is to facilitate
the settlement of disputes.' The court is now under the duty of active
case management to encourage and promote the use of an alternative
dispute resolution procedure where appropriate.2 Of all the various
non-litigious methods to resolve disputes, the judiciary gave promin-
ence to mediation.3 One of the most oft-cited benefits of mediation is
confidentiality in the process, which allows the parties to freely ex-
change their needs and explore creative solutions to problems. Widely
recognized as vital to the prospects of settlement, the common law
has long afforded protection for confidentiality in all types of settle-
ment negotiations. But the current legal framework does not distinctly
define the contents and scope of mediation confidentiality. As Hong
Kong is at the moment considering legislation on mediation, it is time
to understand why a mediation ordinance is needed and how it can
provide greater certainty for confidentiality of mediation
communications.
This paper will first explain the implications of confidentiality to the
mediation process, mediation participants and mediators. It will then
analyse different sources of mediation confidentiality recognized at
common law. After exploring the practical limits of the existing legal
framework, it will evaluate local institutional efforts to promote the
concept of mediation confidentiality. The paper will conclude with
discussions on the role of future mediation legislation in Hong Kong.
II. Legal Protection for Mediation Confidentiality
Confidentiality is regarded as an important philosophical tenet of
mediation.' It offers a private negotiating sphere for mediation par-
ticipants to come to an agreement of their own. A secure process
controlled by a neutral mediator dispels the fear that what passed in
1 Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), 0. 1A, r. 1(e).
2 Ibid., 0. 1A, r. 4(1), (2)(e).
3 The Judiciary of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 'Practice Direction
31: Mediation' (12 February 2009).
4 David Spencer and Michael Brogan, Mediation Law and Practice (Cambridge
University Press: Melbourne, 2006) 312.
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mediation may be used against the parties in subsequent proceedings.
This helps build mutual trust between the parties, so that they would
participate in open and frank settlement negotiations in good faith.
Confidentiality is not only beneficial to the parties, but also the medi-
ators. Being exempted from giving evidence and producing record
notes in the court, mediators can concentrate on the process, medi-
ation soft skills and the needs of the parties in each case.
In this paper, the word 'confidentiality' is an umbrella term describ-
ing the status of communications made in mediation. It encompasses
three distinct concepts at common law: contractual or implied obliga-
tions of confidentiality, legal professional privilege and the without
prejudice rule. It is useful to examine these concepts in turn and
determine how far they give rights to or impose obligations on medi-
ation participants and mediators not to divulge communications made
in the process to third parties.
i. Contractual or Implied Obligations of Confidentiality
Generally, mediation participants and the mediator sign a written
agreement before mediation begins. A typical mediation agreement
sets out express obligations of confidentiality between the partici-
pants, between any of them and the mediator, and on the mediator.'
Participants are required not to rely on or disclose to any other person
all information produced for, arising out of, or in connection with the
mediation in subsequent proceedings concerning the dispute. They
will not call the mediator as a witness, or demand the mediator to
produce record notes, in those proceedings. Mediators also have both
general and specific obligations. The mediator will not reveal any-
thing discussed in the mediation unless permitted by all parties or
compelled by law to do so. In addition, the mediator will not disclose
the communications made in separate meetings with either party ex-
cept with that party's consent. Absent such an express contractual
provision, a similar duty of confidentiality would arise in the context
of mediation by implication or in equity.'
Yet a duty of confidentiality is not an absolute bar to disclosure in
legal proceedings.' The court will compel disclosure of all relevant
information needed for the fair disposal of a case.' Ramsey J in Farm
5 See, for example, Law Society of Hong Kong, 'Mediation Rules', r. 12; Law Society
of Hong Kong, 'Sample Mediation Agreement', cl. 6; Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre, 'Mediation Rules', rr. 12, 14; Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre, 'Agreement to Mediate', cl. 5.
6 R.G. Toulson and C.M. Phipps, Confidentiality, 2nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell: London,
2006) para. 15-016.
7 Paragon Finance Plc (formerly National Home Loans Corporation Plc) v Freshfields
(a firm) [19991 1 WLR 1183 at 1188, CA.
8 Three Rivers DC v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No. 4) [2004]
UKHL 48; [2005] 1 AC 610 [28].
265
COMMON LAW WORLD REVIEW
Assist Ltd (In Liquidation) v Secretary of State for the Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs9 summarized the principles as follows:
The proceedings are confidential both as between the parties and as
between the parties and the mediator. As a result even if the parties
agree that matters can be referred to outside the mediation, the medi-
ator can enforce the confidentiality provision. The court will generally
uphold that confidentiality but where it is necessary in the interests of
justice for evidence to be given of confidential matters, the Courts will
order or permit that evidence to be given or produced.
In that case, the court refused the mediator's application to set aside
her witness summons. The contractual and implied duty of confidenti-
ality yielded to the interests of the administration of justice in receiv-
ing her testimonial evidence, so that the court could determine
whether economic duress invalidated the concluded compromise be-
tween the parties.
ii. Legal Professional Privilege
It is common for a mediation party to show the mediator a letter of
legal advice"o or a document brought into existence for the dominant
purpose of a contemplated or pending litigation" in separate meet-
ings. That party can assert legal professional privilege and refuse to
disclose such confidential communications in subsequent proceed-
ings. Lord Scott of Foscote in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England
(No. 6)12 explained the scope of the privilege:
[I]f a communication or document qualifies for legal professional privi-
lege, the privilege is absolute. It cannot be overridden by some suppos-
edly greater public interest. It can be waived by the person, the client,
entitled to it and it can be overridden by statute, but it is otherwise
absolute. There is no balancing exercise that has to be carried out.
An apparent exception is where the client and its legal adviser have
abused their confidential relationship to facilitate crime or fraud.13
Sharing a privileged communication with the mediator does not
constitute a waiver. Therefore, the right to assert legal professional
privilege remains." To hold otherwise would set unnecessary limits to
the ability of mediators to receive mediation secrets from each party
and use them to bring about settlements.
9 Farm Assist Ltd (In Liquidation) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs [20091 EWHC 1102, TCC, para. 44.
10 Greenough v Gaskell [1824-34] All ER 767.
11 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England
(Disclosure) (No. 5) [2003] EWCA Civ 474; [2003] QB 1556; Three Rivers DC, above
n. 8.
12 Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 at 646.
13 Paragon Finance, above n. 7 at 1188.
14 Farm Assist, above n. 9 at para. 44.
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iii. The Without Prejudice Rule
Even before litigation became excessively complex and costly, the
common law had adopted the without prejudice rule to promote
settlement out of court." The aim of the rule is to free opposing
parties of the fear that what they say during settlement negotiations
could be used to their disadvantage in subsequent legal proceedings.
It renders communications made in aid of settlement both inadmis-
sible in evidence and immune from disclosure. The protection covers
statements made by the parties" and those obtained from third par-
ties" automatically," provided that they form part of a genuine at-
tempt to arrive at an agreed resolution. 9 The protection applies to all
forms of settlement negotiations, including mediation.20
The without prejudice rule is primarily founded on public policy.
Oliver LJ in Cutts v Head"1 remarked:
[T]he rule rests, at least in part, on public policy is clear from many
authorities, and the convenient starting point of the inquiry is the nature
of the underlying policy. It is that parties should be encouraged so far as
possible to settle their disputes without resort to litigation and should
not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything that is said in the
course of such negotiations (and that includes, of course, as much the
failure to reply to an offer as an actual reply) may be used to their
prejudice in the course of the proceedings. They should, as it was ex-
pressed by Clauson J in Scott Paper Co v Drayton Paper Works Ltd
(1927) 44 RPC 151 at 157, be encouraged freely and frankly to put their
cards on the table ...
Lord Griffiths endorsed this view in Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater
London Council22 and observed that the rule 'is founded upon the
public policy of encouraging litigants to settle their differences rather
than litigate them to a finish'.
Later, Hoffmann LI (as he then was) in Muller v Linsley & Mortimer
(a firm)23 added the second basis of the rule:
Cutts v Head shows that the rule has two justifications. Firstly, the public
policy of encouraging parties to negotiate and settle their disputes out
of court and, secondly, an implied agreement arising out of what is
commonly understood to be the consequences of offering or agreeing to
15 See, for example, Walker v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335.
16 Jackson v Ministry of Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 46.
17 Rabin v Mendoza & Co [1954] 1 All ER 247.
18 Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprungli AG v Nestl6 Co. Ltd [1978] RPC 287; Rush &
Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280, HL; Bradford & Bingley Plc
v Rashid [2005] EWCA Civ 1080; Jackson, above n. 16.
19 Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623; Parry v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [1990] NLJR 1719, CA.
20 Reed Executive Plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 887; [2004] 4
All ER 942.
21 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306.
22 Rush & Tompkins, above n. 18 at 1299.
23 Muller v Linsley and Mortimer (a firm) [1996] 1 PNLR 74 at 77; see also Unilever Plc
v Procter & Gamble Co [2000] 1 WLR 2436 at 2442; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v
Prudential Insurance Co of America (No. 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1154; [2004] ETMR 29.
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negotiate without prejudice. In some cases both of these justifications
are present; in others, only one or the other.
The two justifications are inter-related. The without prejudice rule
offers protection for settlement negotiations on grounds of public
policy. Once the parties have agreed to negotiate on that basis, con-
siderations of elementary justice dictate that expectations created by
the law must not be disappointed by the law." The rationale behind
the rule is not only essential for understanding its purpose, but also
useful for determining its extent.
In Muller, Hoffmann LI took the view that only admissions were
protected." Robert Walker LI (as he then was) in Unilever Plc v The
Procter & Gamble Co" emphatically rejected this narrow approach.
He warned that dissecting out identifiable admissions and withhold-
ing protection from the rest of without prejudice communications
would create huge practical difficulties. Further, he pointed out that
drawing such a distinction would be contrary to the underlying ob-
jective of encouraging the parties to speak freely about all issues in
the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise and,
for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise, admitting cer-
tain facts. These authorities were subjected to an exhaustive review by
the House of Lords in its recent decision in Ofulue v Bossert.27 Lord
Hope of Craighead, with whom Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, Lord
Rodger of Earlsferry and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe concurred,
approved of Robert Walker L's analysis as being consistent with the
approach in Rush & Tompkins and that of the courts in the nineteenth
century.28 His Lordship agreed that singling out admissions was too
subtle to apply in practice.29 He observed that Hoffmann L's distinc-
tion appeared to be limited to the public policy reason for the without
prejudice rule and ignored the contractual reason. 30 His Lordship
concluded:31
[S]ave perhaps where it is wholly unconnected with the issues between
the parties to the proceedings, a statement in without prejudice negoti-
ations should not be admissible in evidence, other than in exceptional
circumstances such as those mentioned in the Unilever case [2000] 1
WLR 2436, 2444d-2445g.
24 Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, 2nd edn
(Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2006) para. 16.5.
25 Muller, above n. 23 at 79.
26 Unilever, above n. 23 at 2448-9.
27 Ofulue v Bossert [20091 1 AC 990, HL.
28 Ibid. at 1021.
29 Ibid. at 1023.
30 Ibid. at 1023.
31 Ibid. at 1022.
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It is clear that although the without prejudice rule is broad in scope,
its well-established exceptions could lead to loss of confidentiality in
mediation in practice.
III. Practical Limits of the Current Legal Framework
As has already been noted, the legal protection for confidentiality in
mediation is far from absolute. Express and implied obligations of
confidentiality yield to the public interest in the administration of
justice. Legal professional privilege is subject to statutory abrogation
and the criminal purpose exception. Increasing concerns about par-
ties' conduct in mediation and the fairness of mediated settlements
have prompted the courts to lift the without prejudice veil. Robert
Walker LJ in the Unilever case3 2 summarized eight of the most im-
portant instances. Recent first instance decisions in England and
Wales illustrate that these without prejudice exceptions apply equally
in the context of mediation, which will be discussed below.
i. Proof of a Settlement Agreement
Without prejudice communications are admissible to prove whether
they have resulted in an agreed settlement.33 Danckwerts LJ in Tomlin
v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd3 ' explained that it would be
impossible to decide whether there was a concluded compromise or
not unless one looked at the contents of the negotiations. It might be
the intention of the parties that there was a binding agreement con-
tained in those communications. Alternatively, Hoffmann LJ in the
Muller case35 held that such communications were relevant because
they might constitute the offer and acceptance of a contract that re-
placed the cause of action previously in dispute. On either basis, proof
of a concluded compromise is consistent with the public policy aspect
of the without prejudice rule, and thus is not a true exception.
In Brown v Rice & Patel,36 the issue for the court was whether the
parties had settled in a mediation that took place shortly before the
trial. Stuart Isaacs QC, sitting as a High Court judge, held that excep-
tions to the without prejudice rule applied to mediation despite the
fact that it is a form of assisted without prejudice negotiation. 37 The
judge admitted into evidence the mediator's manuscript, his corres-
pondence to the parties, and testimonial evidence of what the parties
had said and done in the mediation. Nonetheless, he found that the
second respondent's offer to settle did not deal with the manner of
32 Unilever, above n. 23 at 2444-5.
33 Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378; [1969] 3 All ER
201.
34 Ibid. at 1382-3.
35 Muller, above n. 23 at 79-80.
36 Brown v Rice & Patel [2007] EWHC 625, Ch; [2008] FSR 3.
37 Ibid. at paras 15, 21.
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disposal of the litigation. For this reason, the offer was incomplete
and incapable of being accepted to form an agreed settlement.
ii. Estoppel
Where, even if there is no concluded compromise, a party made a
clear and unambiguous statement with the intention that the other
party to the without prejudice negotiations would rely on it and in fact
did so, that other party may adduce the statement as evidence and
raise an estoppel.38 Neuberger J in Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards
Mobility Services Ltd (No. 2)39 reasoned that it would be plainly uncon-
scionable to allow the first party to hide behind the cloak of without
prejudice. Furthermore, it was consistent with the exception of prov-
ing the existence of a settlement agreement.40
Such an issue arose in the Brown case.4' The second respondent
made an oral offer to settle during a mediation. The applicant pur-
portedly accepted the offer by fax within the acceptance period. But
an express term in the mediation agreement required that any settle-
ment agreement must be in writing and signed by or on behalf of all
parties. The applicant argued that giving effect to the express term
would deprive the acceptance period of any meaning. The argument
was one of estoppel, although the applicant relied on an implied
waiver of the term instead. Stuart Isaacs QC rejected both grounds,
holding that the express term dealt with the form of a settlement
agreement, not whether there was a settlement at all. Thus, it could
not render the existence of the acceptance period otiose.
iii. Proof of a Vitiating Factor
Evidence of without prejudice negotiations is admissible to show that
a settlement agreement should be set aside on grounds of misrepres-
entation, fraud or undue influence.42 In Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secret-
ary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs" and the
Farm Assist case," each claimant sought to set aside a mediated
settlement for economic duress. Ramsey J refused to strike out the
claim in Ruttle Plant and declined to set aside a witness summons for
the mediator in Farm Assist. The judge was right in reaching these
conclusions, as justice requires the court to find out and disapprove
settlement agreements that were unfairly entered into.
38 Hodgkinson & Corby Ltd v Wards Mobility Services Ltd (No. 2) [1997] FSR 178 at
190-1, reversed in [1998] FSR 530, CA, but not disapproved on this point on
appeal.
39 Hodgkinson & Corby, above n. 38 at 190-1.
40 Ibid. at 191.
41 Brown, above n. 36.
42 Underwood v Cox (1912) 4 DLR 66.
43 Ruttle Plant Hire Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs [2007] EWHC 2870, TCC; [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 264.
44 Farm Assist, above n. 9.
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iv. Proof of Unambiguous Impropriety
The court may look at evidence of without prejudice negotiations if its
exclusion would act as a cloak for perjury, blackmail or other unam-
biguous impropriety."* This exception targets a clear case of abuse of
the rule's protection. 6 Rix LI in Savings & Investment Bank Ltd (In
Liquidation) v Fincken" reiterated that the public interest in the with-
out prejudice rule was not to be sacrificed save in truly exceptional
and needy circumstances.
The narrow scope of this exception is illustrated in Venture Invest-
ment Placement Ltd v Hall."8 In that case, the claimant sought an
interim injunction restraining the defendant from disclosing to any
third parties what was said in the mediation. Deputy Judge Reid QC
granted the application and held that the defendant could not rely on
the unambiguous impropriety exception because there was a serious
question to be tried as to whether anything said in the mediation
could amount to impropriety.
v. Explaining Delay in Proceedings
Without prejudice communications are admissible to explain delay in
the proceedings or a party's apparent acquiescence to such delay.49
Lindley LJ in Walker v Wilsherso noted that the court could take into
account the existence of without prejudice communications and when
they were made. But Robert Walker LI in the Unilever case" observed
that the court might refer to fuller evidence in order to have a fair
picture of the rights and wrongs of the delay. In practice, this excep-
tion becomes less significant where the parties entered into settlement
negotiations on the basis of 'without prejudice save as to costs'.
vi. Without Prejudice Save as to Costs
The parties can vary the application of the without prejudice rule on
matters passing in settlement negotiations by agreement. A good
example is settlement communications made 'without prejudice ex-
cept as to costs'.53 In the absence of such a negotiating basis, the court
45 Forster v Friedland [1992] CA Transcript 1052; Finch v Wilson (8 May 1987,
unreported); Hawick Jersey International v Caplan, The Times, 11 March 1988.
46 Forster, above n. 45; see also Fazil-Alizadeh v Nikbin, The Times, 19 March 1993.
47 Savings & Investment Bank Ltd (In Liquidation) v Fincken [2003] EWCA Civ 1630;
[2004] 1 All ER 1125.
48 Venture Investment Placement Ltd v Hall [2005] EWHC 1227, Ch.
49 Walker, above n. 15 at 338.
50 Ibid.
51 Unilever, above n. 23.
52 Cutts v Head, above n. 21 at 316.
53 Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333, reaffirmed in Cutts v Head, above
n. 21, and approved in Rush & Tompkins, above n. 18.
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has no jurisdiction to compel disclosure of without prejudice negoti-
ations, even though that may prevent it from determining the reason-
ableness of a refusal to participate in mediation."
vii. Establishing Reasonable Conduct
Where a claimant alleges that it has acted reasonably to mitigate its
loss in its conduct and conclusion of settlement negotiations, and then
seeks any shortfall from a non-party to the settlement negotiations in
legal proceedings, the claimant waives the without prejudice protec-
tion over negotiation materials." Swinton Thomas and Leggatt LJJ in
the Muller case" held that the court could compel disclosure of all the
documents leading to the settlement on the ground that the claimant
had put its conduct in issue and that it would be inequitable not to
order discovery.
However, this exception did not apply in the recent case of Cumbria
Waste Management Ltd & Lakeland Waste Management Ltd v Baines
Wilson (A Firm). In that case, the defendant sought to obtain dis-
closure of documents of a successful mediation between the claimants
and a third party, because it was sued for the shortfall between the
amount invoiced and the settlement monies due to professional negli-
gence. Her Honour Judge Kirkham, sitting as a High Court judge,
recognized that the third party was entitled to resist disclosure:"8
The circumstances in Muller are different from those which obtain here.
In that case, it was the plaintiffs who sought to deny disclosure of
without prejudice material. Here, the question is whether a third party's
without prejudice material should be disclosed. The Court of Appeal in
Muller gave no consideration to the position of a third party. In this case
the privilege belongs not only to the claimants but also to DEFRA. There
are public policy reasons why DEFRA should be entitled to assert that
privilege: DEFRA are entitled to protect from disclosure material which
may embarrass them in other disputes.
viii. Matrimonial and Parental Conciliation Privilege
A distinct privilege has developed by way of analogy with the without
prejudice rule in relation to family conciliation. 9 The privilege, based
on the public interest in the stability of marriage, renders negotiations
intended to settle matrimonial and parental disputes inadmissible ex-
cept in the rare case where it is necessary to adduce such evidence for
protecting the well-being of a child.60
54 Reed Executive, above n. 20.
55 Muller, above n. 23.
56 Ibid.
57 Cumbria Waste Management Ltd & Lakeland Waste Management Ltd v Baines
Wilson (A Firm) [2008] EWHC 786, QB.
58 Cumbria Waste Management, above n. 57 at para. 24.
59 Re D (Minors) (Conciliation: Disclosure of Information) [1993] Fam 231 at 238.
60 Ibid. at 240-1.
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This development lends support for the recent debate as to the
possible existence of mediation privilege and the desirability for a
mediator's privilege at common law. Ramsey J in the Farm Assist Ltd
case6 2 said that there was no special privilege attaching to the medi-
ation process or the mediator. Stuart Isaacs QC in the Brown case 63
left this question to be considered by the legislature or the courts.
IV. Institutional Efforts to Regulate Mediation
Confidentiality
Attempts have been made by major mediation service providers, the
judiciary and the government in Hong Kong to regulate mediation
confidentiality. The Mediation Rules of the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre provide:
Confidentiality
12. (i) Mediation is a private and confidential process. Every document,
communication or information disclosed, made or produced by
any party for the purpose of or related to the mediation process
shall be disclosed on a privileged and without prejudice basis
and no privilege or confidentiality shall be waived by such dis-
closure. Confidentiality also extends to the settlement agreement
except where its disclosure is necessary for implementation or
enforcement.
(ii) Nothing that transpires during the course of the mediation is
intended to or shall in any way affect the rights or prejudice the
position of the parties to the dispute in any subsequent arbitra-
tion, adjudication or litigation.
Mediator's Role in Subsequent Proceedings
14. The parties undertake that the mediator shall not be appointed as
adjudicator, arbitrator or representative, counsel or expert wit-
ness of any party in any subsequent adjudication, arbitration or
judicial proceedings whether arising out of the mediation or any
other dispute in connection with the same contract. No party
shall be entitled to call the mediator as a witness in any sub-
sequent adjudication, arbitration or judicial proceedings arising
out of the same contract.
The Mediation Rules of the Hong Kong Law Society reflect the con-
cept of confidentiality in a similar manner. In addition, the Law
Society's Mediation Rules give a detailed account of the types of
61 Henry Brown and Arthur Marriott QC, ADR: Principles and Practice (Sweet &
Maxwell: London, 1999) paras 22-079 to 22-097.
62 Farm Assist, above n. 9 at para. 43.
63 Brown, above n. 36 at para. 20.
64 Law Society of Hong Kong, 'Mediation Rules', art. 12.
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communications that are inadmissible in any subsequent proceed-
ings" and those that are admissible for enforcing a settlement agree-
ment." The rules also offer examples demonstrating that
communications passed in mediation would not affect the rights or
prejudice the position of the parties in subsequent proceedings.6 7
Although the professional rules make reference to mediation con-
fidentiality, they fail to deal with the exact scope and well-established
limits of the existing legal framework. The terms 'confidential', 'privil-
eged' and 'without prejudice' are used interchangeably without dis-
tinction. Only one apparent exception to the legal protection-the
enforcement of mediated settlements-is emphasized. Unless clarified
by individual mediators, these mediation rules encourage general
members of the public to mediate with a mistaken belief that what
they say in the process can never be used against them or disclosed to
any third party. This situation is certainly unsatisfactory to the healthy
development of alternative dispute resolution processes in Hong
Kong.
As an important part of the Civil Justice Reform, the Judiciary of
Hong Kong promulgated a practice direction on mediation to assist
the courts in discharging the duty of facilitating settlement of dis-
putes. Article 6 of Practice Direction 3168 states:
In all contexts, including dealing with matters arising under this PD and
in exercising its discretion on costs, the Court cannot compel the dis-
closure of or admit materials so long as they are protected by privilege
65 Article 12(a) of the Hong Kong Law Society's Mediation Rules provides that '[t]he
parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in any subsequent judicial or
arbitral proceedings:- (i) any oral or written exchanges within the mediation
made in connection with any mediation conducted under these Rules between a
party and the mediator or between any party; (ii) any views expressed or
suggestions made within the mediation either by the mediator or a party in respect
of a possible settlement of the dispute; (iii) any admission made by a party in
connection with any mediation conducted under these Rules; (iv) the fact that a
party had or had not indicated a willingness to accept any suggestion or proposal
for settlement by the mediator or by any party; and (v) any documents brought into
existence for the purpose of the mediation including any notes or records made in
connection with any mediation conducted under these Rules by the mediator or a
party.'
66 Article 12(a) of the Hong Kong Law Society's Mediation Rules provides that
'. . . when any party enforces a settlement agreement any party may call evidence
of the settlement agreement including evidence from the mediator and any other
person engaged in the mediation.'
67 Article 12(b) of the Hong Kong Law Society's Mediation Rules lists the following
two examples: '(i) the fact that information of whatsoever nature was available to
the mediator does not mean that privilege or confidentiality is waived for any
subsequent litigation, arbitration or adjudication; and (ii) the fact that the accuracy
of information or the validity or meaning of documents was not challenged during
the mediation does not preclude challenge in subsequent litigation, arbitration or
adjudication.'
68 Practice Direction 31: Mediation, above n. 3.
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in accordance with legal principles, including legal professional privil-
ege and the privilege protecting without prejudice communications.
What happens during the mediation process, being without prejudice
communications, is protected by privilege. It must be emphasized that
there is no question of the Court undermining the protection afforded
by privilege.
It is clear that the practice direction displays weaknesses similar to
those of the professional rules.
In February 2010, the Department of Justice of the Hong Kong
Government published a report of its Working Group on Mediation.
The Working Group reviewed many important issues that are funda-
mental to the more effective and extensive application of mediation in
both commercial and community disputes. It recommended that a
new stand-alone6 1 mediation ordinance be enacted70 with an aim to
providing a proper legislative framework for the conduct of medi-
ation.7 ' The proposed legislation represents the government's ap-
proval of mediation as a legitimate means of alternative dispute
resolution, which, in turn, will promote its use to the general public
and the legal profession.
Acknowledging that uncertainty exists in the common law prin-
ciples governing mediation confidentiality,73 the Working Group
made a recommendation that the proposed ordinance should deal
with the general rules of confidentiality, exceptions to the rules and
sanctions for breaches. Codification of the existing legal framework
would no doubt promote generality and clarity. The legal principles
and well-established exceptions discussed in the previous sections
deserve a place in the new legislation. Sadly the Working Group
appeared conservative as to how the proposed ordinance can provide
greater protection for mediation confidentiality. While a statutory
right for mediation participants and mediators to seek an injunction
to restrain unauthorized use of confidential materials is under con-
sideration,m the Working Group was silent as to whether there should
be a privilege specific to mediation. It is not helpful to have a cursory
look at the legislation in selected jurisdictions;'6 only two of them
enacted a mediation privilege and took different approaches.
69 Department of Justice of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, 'Report of the Working Group on Mediation' (February 2010) paras
7.27-7.37.
70 Ibid., Recommendation 32.
71 Ibid. at paras 7.19-7.21.
72 Ibid. at paras 7.22-7.25.
73 Ibid. at paras 7.132-7.133.
74 Ibid. at para. 7.128; Recommendation 38.
75 Ibid. at para. 7.138.
76 Ibid. at paras 7.124-7.127.
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The United States Uniform Mediation Act77 creates a mediation
communication privilege. The privilege covers communications made
to initiate and participate in a mediation," founded on the empirical
assumption that it is essential for promoting candour of parties and
public confidence and for balancing the interests of justice against the
private need for confidentiality.7 9 Privileged communications are im-
mune from disclosure and inadmissibleso in subsequent court pro-
ceedings or other adjudicative processes."' Both mediators and
mediation parties are eligible to assert the privilege attached to a
mediation communication." In addition, mediators and non-party
participants are entitled to protect their own communications in the
mediation." The privilege applies unless waived," precluded by rea-
son of prejudicing another party in a proceeding" or if it fell within
one of the exceptions.8 6 The exceptions may be classified into two
groups: where societal interest in a mediation communication out-
weighs the private interest in confidentiality 7 and where the relative
strengths of societal and private interests are to be determined by the
court on a case by case basis." Unless agreed to the contrary, the
privilege extends to international commercial mediation, overriding
the narrower scope of evidentiary exclusions under article 10 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation.89
77 The National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws approved and
recommended for enactment the Uniform Mediation Act in all states in August
2001: <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm>
accessed 8 April 2010. As of December 2009, 11 states adopted the Act. They are:
District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont and Washington: <http://www.mwi.org/uma/> accessed 8
April 2010.
78 Uniform Mediation Act, above n. 77 at s. 2(2).
79 Ibid., Prefatory Note and Comments to section 4.
80 Ibid. at s. 4(a).
81 Ibid. at s. 2(7).
82 Ibid. at s. 4(b)(1), (2).
83 Ibid. at s. 4(b)(2), (3).
84 Ibid. at s. 5(a).
85 Ibid. at s. 5(b).
86 Ibid. at s. 6.
87 Ibid. at s. 6(a). No privilege attaches to a mediation communication which is a
signed mediated agreement, a public document, a threat of bodily harm or violent
crime, a plan to commit or conceal criminal activity, the response to a claim of
misconduct or malpractice of a mediator or a mediation participant, and evidence
related to abuse, neglect, abandonment or exploitation in child or adult protection
proceedings.
88 Ibid. at s. 6(b). Where a mediation communication is proposed to be used in a
criminal proceeding or in challenging the mediated agreement, the court may hold
an in camera evidentiary hearing and allow disclosure if the need for the evidence
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality under the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.
89 Ibid. at s. 11.
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A similar development has been gaining currency in European law.
The Mediation Directive 90 sets out five measures 91 to encourage the
use of mediation in cross-border disputes, 92 one of which is a medi-
ator's privilege. Article 7(1) provides that mediators can refuse to
testify in judicial proceedings or arbitration regarding any informa-
tion arising out of or in connection with a mediation process, unless
the parties agree, overriding considerations of public policy arise, or
the disclosure is necessary in order to implement or enforce a con-
cluded agreement. The qualified protection for mediation confidenti-
ality is also based on empirical assumptions that confidentiality is
important" and fosters full and meaningful communications.94 The
Directive does not only guarantee the minimum level of confidentiality
in cross-border mediation,95 but it also stimulates parallel protection
at the domestic level.
V. Conclusion
Settlement of disputes has become all the more important in the re-
formed civil justice system in Hong Kong. The current legal frame-
work promotes the prospects of settlement by maintaining
confidentiality in settlement negotiations at common law. Obligations
of confidentiality, legal professional privilege and the without preju-
dice rule provide confidentiality in mediation communications. But
recent first instance decisions in England and Wales show that these
principles do not confer a blanket right to shield mediation commun-
ications in subsequent proceedings.
Various local institutions put efforts to assure confidentiality in
mediation as part of their drive to facilitate the greater use of this
alternative dispute resolution procedure. Unfortunately, leading medi-
ation service providers failed to reflect the scope and limits of the
common law principles in the internal rules. The judiciary did not take
up the challenge to clarify areas of uncertainty at common law. The
government has sensibly recommended the enactment of specific leg-
islation on mediation, but it must grasp this opportunity to provide
further legal protection for mediation confidentiality. In order to
maintain Hong Kong's harmonious community and its status as a
leading financial and business centre, the proposed mediation ordin-
ance should adopt comprehensive sanctions for breach of confidenti-
ality and an appropriate form of mediation privilege.
90 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters (the
Mediation Directive) [2008] OJ L163/3.
91 Mediation Directive, above n. 90 at arts 4-8.
92 Ibid. at art. 1.
93 Ibid., recital 23.
94 Commission (EC), 'Alternative dispute resolution in civil and commercial law'
(Green Paper) COM (2002) 196 final, 19 April 2002, para. 79.
95 Mediation Directive, above n. 90, recital 23, art. 7(2).
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